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THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW - IS THERE LIFE BEYOND NAMING AND SHAMING IN 
HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLEMENTATION? 
Dr. Elvira Domínguez Redondo
*
 
Abstract 
The article examines the traditional manner in which human rights implementation has been 
focused on confrontational approaches, in particular on the practice of “naming-and-
shaming”, while more cooperative models of have been traditionally overlooked. Through the 
prism of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) it tests the effectiveness of non-
confrontational approaches to human rights implementation. The paper challenges the 
conventional wisdom among human rights advocates that non-confrontational mechanisms 
are synonymous with lack of efficiency and impact, and suggests that some of the 
commitments made by states during the UPR process could be interpreted as potential 
sources of obligations under International Law. 
INTRODUCTION 
Much ink has been split on debates over the universality and the normative content of human 
rights. Far less energy has been devoted towards an analysis of the different conceptions as to 
the best mechanisms for their enforcement. “Naming and shaming” is the most widely used 
pressure mechanism by international bodies in charge of monitoring human rights 
compliance. Other “confrontational approaches” to human rights implementation, as we will 
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define them in the context of these pages, have also been used to put pressure on States in 
order to compel them to improve their human rights record. While there is a welcome 
growing body of scholarship assessing the efficiency of these confrontational approaches to 
human rights implementation, more cooperative mechanisms to promote human rights 
compliance are often overlooked. This is largely due to the articulation of human rights as 
legal claims which imply an emphasis on accountability mechanisms for implementation. 
Because human rights violations are an expression of a breach of law, some process of 
adjudication of responsibility, leading to the punishment of the violators and the redress of 
victims is expected.  
Through the prism of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) the following pages test 
the outcomes of the most universal non-confrontational approach to human rights 
implementation. This article seeks to refute one of the most prominent criticisms concerning 
the newest of international mechanisms for the promotion and protection of human rights. It 
has been claimed that this new mechanism could not be successful precisely because it relies 
on co-operation more than confrontation. In the following pages it is argued that the UPR can 
have an added value for the human rights implementation machinery, precisely if it retains its 
perception among States of being a predominantly co-operative tool of the human rights 
regime, supplementing but not replacing the work already completed by the UN charter and 
treaty-based bodies with mandates for the promotion and protection of human rights and 
complimenting their on-going activities. This does not necessarily mean that the impact of the 
UPR should be constrained to the political realm with little to no legal teeth. Some of the 
features of this procedure provide space to argue for the legal relevance of the outcomes of 
the reviews, particularly the consideration of unilateral acts of States as sources of 
international obligations. With this purpose, the article is divided into four sections. The first 
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outlines the features of the Universal Periodic Review and the main criticisms directed 
towards it, the second section clarifies the meaning of, and distinctions between, 
“confrontational” and “co-operative” approaches to the implementation on human rights. It 
also addresses the rationale behind the use of confrontational approaches towards human 
rights implementation, with particular focus on the tendency to see judicial adjudication as 
the most appropriate model for their realization. This is followed in part three by an 
examination of the traditional manner in which human rights implementation and scrutiny 
have been conducted, focusing in particular on the practice of “naming-and-shaming”, its 
modalities and our understanding of its effectiveness and limitations as the primary 
mechanism for the promotion and protection of human rights. The final section engages in an 
analysis of the process and outcomes of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). This will 
enable us to explore the hypothesis that a non-confrontational, and non-selective country 
mechanism may the optimum strategy, or at least a reasonable strategy, to promote and 
protect human rights. The paper concludes that the dynamics established in the operation of 
the UPR reveal that non-confrontational mechanisms are not always synonymous with lack of 
impact and their outcomes do not necessarily have lesser legal weight than those of 
traditional confrontational approaches. On the contrary, it will be argued that the body of 
information resulting from the process and some of the commitments made by states in the 
course of the UPR could be interpreted as evidence of opinio juris, or as potential sources of 
obligations under International Law.  
 The Universal Periodic Review and its Critics 
A. The Universal Periodic Review in a nutshell 
The former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan proposed a “peer review” mechanism to 
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monitor human rights world wide as part of his programme of reform launched in 2005.
1
 The 
foundations of the mechanisms were outlined in GA Res 60/251 of 16 March 2006 creating 
the Human Rights Council, where its paragraph 5 ordered the newly established organ to:  
...undertake a universal periodic review, based on objective and reliable information, of 
the fulfillment by each State of its human rights obligations and commitments in a 
manner which ensures universality of coverage and equal treatment with respect to all 
States; the review shall be a cooperative mechanism, based on an interactive dialogue, 
withthe full involvement of the country concerned and with consideration given to its 
capacity-buiding needs; such a mechanism shall complement and not duplicate the work 
of treaty bodies.
2
 
It took one year more for the so called “institution-building package” to be approved 
                                                          
1
 In Larger Freedom: Development, Security and Human Rights for all-Addendum: Human Rights Council 
Explanatory Note, UN doc. A/59/2005/Add.1, paragraphs 6 and 7. See also alternative models proposed by 
Canada presented as “Model A: The Comprehensive Approach” and “Model B: The Interactive dialogue”, in 
Human Rights. Peer Review. Draft Concept and Option Paper Prepared by Canada, Report of the Workshop on 
the Reforms of the UN Human Rights Mechanisms, Annex III, Lausanne, Switzerland, 2 May 2005 (available at 
http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/intorg/un/missny/59/misc.Par.0002.File.tmp/05
0502-EN.pdf). This non-paper is also available at 
http://www.eyeontheun.org/assets/attachments/documents/human_rights_peer_review_canada.pdf. For a non-
governmental proposal recommending the adoption of a model following existing monitoring mechanisms 
implemented by the International Labour Organisation and the World Trade Organisation see, Amnesty 
International’s Ten-point Program for the Creation of an Authoritative and Effective Human Rights Council, AI 
doc., AI Index: IOR 41/068/2005, 1 November 2005. See also Meghna Abraham, A New Chapter for Human 
Rights. A Handbook on issues of transition from the Commission on Human Rights to the Human Rights Council 
(International Service of Human Rights and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, June 2006) 72; Walter Kälin, Towards a 
UN Human Rights Council, 4 August 2004 (proposal available at 
http://www.humanrights.ch/upload/pdf/050107_kaelin_hr_council.pdf); and Elvira Domínguez-Redondo 
“¿Debe desaparecer la Comisión de Derechos Humanos de Naciones Unidas? [Should the UN Commission on 
Human Rights Have Disappeared?] in José M Beneyto and Belén Becerril (dirs.), Una Nueva organizacion de 
Naciones Unidas para el Siglo XXI (Instituto Universitario de Estudios Europeaos de la Universidad CEU-San 
Pablo, Madrid, 2007) 109 at 120-140 . 
2
 UN GA Res 60/251, paragraph 5(e). 
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providing details about the future functioning of the UPR, which started operating in April 
2008. 
3
 The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) has been designed to appraise the human 
rights records of every State Member of the United Nations. Strictly speaking the review of 
countries human rights situations is only the first stage of a three stages process involved in 
the mechanism. The review is followed by the implementation of the recommendations 
accepted and commitments made by the States during the first stage, and culminates at the 
subsequent review with reporting on the progress made since the previous review. 
During the UPR process, the enjoyment of all human rights in all States is reviewed.
4
 
The benchmarks used as basis of the review consist of a combination of universal human 
rights standards and standards flowing from the specific human rights obligations and 
commitments of the State under review. The benchmarks are derived from: 1) the UN 
Charter; 2) the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; 3) human rights instruments to 
which the State under review is party; 4) voluntary pledges and commitments made by the 
State, including those undertaken when presenting its candidature for election to the Human 
Rights Council; and 5) applicable International Humanitarian Law.
5
 The review mechanism 
is based on an inter-governmental dialogue (peer review), with the participation of other 
                                                          
3
 HRC Res. 5/1 on Institution Building of the Human Rights Council, Annex, paragraphs 1-4 (18 June 2007). 
See also HRC Dec. 6/102, General Guidelines for the Preparation of Information under the Universal Periodic 
Review (27 September 2007); HRC Presidential Statement PRST/8/1, Modalities and Practices for the Universal 
Periodic Review (9 April 2008); HRC Presidential Statement PRST/9/2, Follow-up to President’s statement 8/1 
(24 September 2008); HRC Res. 16/21, Annex, Review of the work and functioning of the Human Rights 
Council (25 March 2011); and HRC Dec. 17/119, Follow up to the Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21 
with regard to the Universal Periodic Review (17 June 2011) 
4
 This is one of the most important advantages of the UPR, since “it epitomizes the unity of human rights”, 
Christian Tomuschat, “Universal Periodic Review: A New System of Interantional Law with Specific Ground 
Rules”, in Ulrich Fastenrath e.a. (eds.) From Bilateralism to Community Interest. Essays in Honour of Judge 
Bruno Simma (Oxford University Press, New York, 2011) 609 at 615. 
5
 HRC Res 5/1, paragraph 1. 
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stakeholders, conducted in a cooperative spirit.
6
 
The first stage of the review is conducted by a working group of the Human Rights 
Council, formed by its 47 members, known as the UPR Working Group, and consists of three 
steps. First, the country under review offers an assessment of its own human rights records. 
Then, the other UN State members have an opportunity to engage in a collective dialogue and 
assessment of the country under review, and make recommendations for improvement. The 
basis for this dialogue are the three documents identified in paragraph 15 of the annex to the 
Human Rights Council Res 5/1, that is, the State under review’s presentation; a compilation 
of information contained in the reports of treaty bodies, special procedures and other relevant 
UN official documents; and a summary, prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, of additional reliable information provided by other relevant stakeholders 
(mainly NGOs, civil society organisations and the national human rights institutions). The 
UPR Working Group session ends with the issuing of an “Outcome Report” submitted to the 
plenary of the Human Rights Council for adoption by a formal decision. A group of three 
States, the troika, is selected by drawing lots among State members of the Human Rights 
Council, with the mandate of facilitating the UPR Working Groups’ task. The troika is the 
first recipient of questions raised by States ahead of the review, and it is expected to cluster 
these in accordance with the content and structure of the report prepared by the State under 
Review. The troika then drafts the Outcome Report with the full involvement of the State 
concerned and the cooperation of the OHCHR. The report is factual, based on the 
proceedings, and is required to reflect the recommendations and/or conclusions offered by 
delegations during the interactive dialogue. States under review are required to communicate 
to the Council in writing if they are accepting or rejecting the recommendations, preferably 
                                                          
6
 On the terminology “peer-review” see Elvira Domínguez-Redondo “The Universal Periodic Review of the UN 
Human Rights Council: An Assessment of the First Session” (2008) 7(3) Chi J Int’l L 721 at 725-6. 
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clustered thematically in the Outcome Report.
7
 
Having completed the review of all the UN State members in October 2011, the first 
cycle served to consolidate rules and establish practices governing the review and its follow-
up, and to introduce additional rules which have become operative during the second review 
cycle, commencing in June 2012. 
In addition to the three documents cited above as basis for the review (the report of 
the State under review, the UN compilation, and the summary of other stakeholders’ 
information) , the second and subsequent cycles of the review aspire to focus on “the 
implementation of the accepted recommendations and the development of human rights 
situations in the State under review”.8 The HRC has adopted general guidelines to assist 
countries under review in preparing the information they have to submit. In particular, States 
are recommended to adopt the following structure: a) description of the methodology and 
consultation process followed for the preparation of the information provided; b) a 
background overview of the developments in the promotion and protection of human rights 
since the previous review; c) a section on the promotion and protection of human rights on 
the ground addressing the implementation of the human rights obligations identified as the 
“basis of review” in resolution 5/1 as outlined above; d) a presentation of the follow-up to the 
previous review; e) identification of achievements, best practices and challenges in relation to 
the implementation of accepted recommendations; f) identification of key national priorities, 
initiatives and commitments to overcome those challenges and improve human rights 
situation in the ground; and g) expectations of the State under review in terms of capacity-
                                                          
7
 HRC Res 16/21 (25 March 2011) above note 3, Annex paragraphs 15 and 16. 
8
 HRC Res. 16/21 (25 March 2011) above note 3 Annex, paragraph 6 and HRC Dec. 17/119 (17 June 2011) 
above note 3, paragraph 2. 
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building, and requests, if any, for technical assistance.
9
 
Therefore, when a State accepts the recommendations under this mechanism it is 
agreeing to be assessed on the implementation of those recommnendations within a period of 
four and a half years, and to report on the measures it has undertaken for their realization.
 10
 
B. Mutual Admiration Society or understanding human rights implementation beyond naming 
and shaming? 
The creation of the UPR responded to the criticism of selectivity and the “rising” 
politicization of the activity of the Commission, a politicization viewed as fatal and the main 
reason for its elimination and substitution. While the existence of persistent violators of 
human rights among the members of the organ was denounced by Western, developed 
democratic States, countries belonging to the Asian Group, African Group and Like Minded 
Group of States saw “naming and shaming” as the main cause for the dysfunctional status of 
the Commission.
11
 This was made worse by the fact that, in practice, some States were 
consistently immune from public scrutiny while others were persistently criticised.
12
 
On the whole the environment preceding the first cycle of review was in keeping with 
the co-operative, non-confrontational approach envisaged from the outset of the creation of 
this procedure. This disappointed many who equated the co-operative approach with 
“softness”: 
                                                          
9
 HRC Dec. 17/119 (17 June 2011) paragraph 2. 
10
 The periodicity of the review has been extended from four to four and a half years by HRC Res. 16/21, Annex 
(25 March 2 011) and HRC Dec. 17/119 (17 June 2011) both cited above note 3. 
11
 Domínguez-Redondo (2007) above note 1. 
12
 Miko Lempinen, The United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the Different Treatment of 
Governments: An Inseparable Part of Promoting and Encouraging Respect for Human Rights? (Åbo Akademi 
University Press, Turku, 2005).  
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…the UN has little need for another toothless mechanism for “cooperative dialogue.” 
We call on Council members to fashion a mechanism that will, in a fair manner, apply 
real scrutiny, to hold governments to account and cite them for violations and 
abuses.
13
 
The UPR’s alleged deficiencies are regarded as flowing from its perception as a mechanism 
which is “wholly dependent upon the good will of the state under review” and therefore of 
little use for “those who are not really willing to participate”. 14  Human Rights non-
governmental organizations, UN human rights treaty and Charter-bodies, have been so 
worried about the potential of the UPR to impact negatively on their work, that some maybe 
themselves –inadvertently- undermining its positive outcomes. For instance, Frouville does 
not mince his words when highlighting the flaws of a mechanism that, in addition to 
penalising cooperative countries, has overshadowed the work of the treaty bodies and of 
special procedures, depriving them of necessary resources.
15
 According to Frouville there is 
no logic behind the decision to webcast the sessions of the UPR Working Group (consisting 
of all the members of the Human Rights Council) instead of the meetings of the committees 
monitoring the compliance of core human rights treaties “during which the good questions 
are put to the government”.16 Considering that webcasting the meetings of the UPR was in 
itself an achievement given the vehement opposition of the African Group and the State 
                                                          
13
 UN Watch Statement, May 15, 2006 available at 
http://www.unwatch.org/site/apps/nl/content2.asp?c=bdKKISNqEmG&b=1330815&ct=2454195&msource=UN
HRC&tr=y&auid=1758634.  
14
 Olivier de Frouville, “Building a Universal System for the Protection of Human Rights: The Way Forward”, 
in M Cherif Bassiouni and William Schabas (eds.) New Challenges for the UN Human Rights Machinery 
(Intersentia, Cambridge, 2011) 241 at 253. 
15
 Ibid. at 251. 
16
 Ibid. at 252. 
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members of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference it is surprising that it merits this kind 
of criticism.
17
 The intent here is not to interrogate the rationale behind devoting resources to 
webcasting the sessions of intergovernmental bodies rather than those of expert committees at 
different levels. Instead it seeks highlighting the general presumption underlying this 
criticism: expert bodies are the only ones that can tackle human rights implementation. This 
general presumption is so entrenched that it is presented as obvious. Frouville tells us the 
“good questions” are asked by the committees, not by members of the UN Human Rights 
Council while Nowak, a highly acclaimed scholar and renowned UN expert who has 
undertaken different UN mandates in an exemplary manner, acknowledges that States take 
the UPR “more seriously than the State reporting procedure before treaty bodies [but] it 
suffers from the disadvantages that States’ performance in the field of human rights is 
assessed by other States rather than by independent experts”. 18  This is linked to a third 
criticism, that is, that political bodies are inappropriate for dealing with legal questions.
19
  
Before assessing the value added to the UN system of promotion and protection of 
human rights by the UPR, it is important to analyse the rationale of the presumption that 
legal, expert-based, “hard question”, more confrontational style approaches to human rights 
implementation are better, and taken to its limit, incompatible with (or undermined and 
                                                          
17
 Domínguez-Redondo (2008) above note 6 at 733, esp fn 334.  
18
 Manfred Nowak, “It’s Time for a World court of Human Rights” in Cherif Bassiouni and William A Schabas 
(eds.) New Challenges for the UN Human Rights Machinery (Intersentia, Cambridge, 2011) 17 at 23. 
19
 Frouville (2011) above note 14 at 254. On the politicisation of treaty body recommendations see also, Gareth 
Sweeney and Yuri Saito, “An NGO Assessment of the New Mechanisms of the UN Human Rights Council” 
(2009) 9(2) Hum Rts L Rev 203 at 210; and Allehone Mulugeta Abebe, “Of Shaming and Bargaining: African 
States and the Universal Periodic Review of the United Nations Human Rigths Council”(2009) 9(1) Human 
Rights L Rev 1 at 19. 
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compromised by) more cooperative, political mechanisms.
20
 
 
Human Rights Implementation: Distinguishing Confrontational and Co-operative 
Approaches to Human Rights Enforcement 
A. Distinction between confrontational and co-operative approaches 
International mechanisms, political strategies or procedures used for the promotion and 
protection of human rights share the common central objective of prompting domestic 
authorities to take necessary actions to guarantee enjoyment of internationally recognised 
human rights within their jurisdiction. International human rights bodies do not have the 
competence to prosecute and punish those responsible for rights violations or to provide 
direct redress to victims of such violations. This extends to the international human rights 
bodies with the sharpest teeth, that is, those with legal competence to issue binding decisions 
including the European Court of Human Rights,
21
 the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights
22
 and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.23 This limitation is not unique 
                                                          
20
 For a challenge to this common presumption from a different perspective to the one used here, see Constance 
de la Vega & Tamara N Lewis, “Peer Review in the Mix: How the UPR Transforms Human Rights Discourse” 
in M Cherif Bassiouni and William A Schabas (eds.) New Challenges for the UN Human Rights Machinery 
(Intersentia, Cambridge, 2011) 353, esp at 366-367. 
21
 Created by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 
November 1950, entry into force 1953, 213 UNTS 221, amended by Protocol No. 11, 5 May 1994, CETS No. 
155)  
22
 Set up in 1979, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights was established by the 1969 American Convention 
of Human Rights (22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123)  
23
 While the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights establishing the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights entered into force in January 2004 [OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT 
(III) (1998)], and the first judges were elected in 2006, the decision to merge this Court with the African Court 
of Justice has delayed the functioning of this Court [Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
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to international human rights institutions, as the power to execution of decisions dictated by 
international bodies remains exclusively within the realm of sovereign state competence, due 
to the lack of a centralized supranational authority to enforce international norms. While the 
progressive institutionalization of international law through the proliferation of international 
organizations has implied some delegation of sovereign powers, States remain the principal 
actors when it comes to enforcing international rules.
24
 Even when States decide to bring a 
dispute to an international court, the judicial body normally settles the dispute without 
dictating how the final result should be reached at the national level. 
The wide range of techniques, strategies and procedures deployed to prompt States to 
comply with their human rights obligations are commonly classified under the generic rubric 
of “promotion and protection” of human rights. The dichotomy between co-operation and 
confrontation to a certain extent mirrors promotion/protection dichotomy. Activities aimed at 
the promotion or protection of human rights share the common objective of achieving the 
fulfilment of the obligation to respect human rights. However, this aim is pursued through 
multiple means which can be broadly categorized under two approaches. The first seeks to 
achieve this end through support to the State concerned by means of positive incentives such 
as provision of assistance (co-operative approach). The second aims to do so through the 
exercise of some form of external pressure or coercion of the state to which the activities are 
addressed (confrontational approach). When the strategies deployed fall within the second 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Human Rights adopted by the Eleventh Ordinary Session of the Assembly, held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, 1st 
July 2008]. 
24
 Related to this discussion is the fragmentation of international law through the proliferation of international 
judicial standards and institutions. See Rosalyn Higgins, “A Babel of judicial voices?: ruminations from the 
bench” (2006) 55(4) Int'l & Comp. LQ 791; Mathew Craven, “Unity, diversity and the fragmentation of 
international law” 14 Finnish Yearbook of Int’l L 3 (2003). Anastasios Gourgourinis, “The Distinction between 
Interpretation and Application of Norms in International Adjudication” (2011) 2(1) J Int’l Disp Settlement 31. 
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group, states are not left to act on their own initiative, but are prompted to do so through 
international pressure, usually following monitoring activities, that may lead to undesirable 
legal or political consequences. It is useful for methodological and expositive purposes to 
classify consensual, non-coercive measures as promotional, and those involving external 
pressure, as protective. In practice, it remains difficult to distinguish activities of protection 
from other essentially promotional acts such as “technical cooperation”. There are no uniform 
definitions available, for either the terms “promotion” or “protection” and they are often used 
interchangeably. In addition, many organs use techniques and procedures mixing approaches 
either successively or simultaneously because organs that have developed successful 
promotional activities often claim protective competences.
25
 
By their nature, promotional activities do not generally give rise to tensions in 
relations with the state targeted by such measures. They are also commonly regarded, within 
the logic of international and diplomatic relations, as the first desirable measures to invoke 
before engaging in more antagonistic approaches. Nonetheless, those in charge of human 
rights mechanisms, scholars and practitioners tend to neglect the potential value of 
cooperative approaches to human rights implementation and focus instead on the 
confrontational approaches to human rights implementation. As explained in the following 
section, this is largely due to the legalistic nature (or perception thereof) of human rights. 
B. The Rationale of Confrontational Approaches to Human Rights Implementation. Judicial 
Fetishism. 
Human rights, as legal claims, have conferred a degree of international legal personality to 
individuals. They have been constructed as imposing obligations on subjects of international 
                                                          
25
 Karel Vasak, “Le Droit International des Droits de l’Homme” (1974-IV) 140 RCADI 333, at 360. 
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law, which consist primarily of States.
26
 Because human rights have a normative force, some 
degree of “penalty” ought to be associated with a failure of compliance, unless we share a 
view of legal norms that can hardly distinguish between binding and non-binding.
27
 In 
addition, a remedy to the victim ought to follow such a violation according to the general 
principle of law prescribing that where there is a right there is a remedy (Ubi jus ibi 
remedium).
28
 The inclusion of human rights provisions within international law has led 
human rights defenders, scholars and practitioners to be prone to “judicial fetishism” and too 
often there is tacit understanding that a norm is not really a norm until articulated by a 
judicial body.
29
 This is linked to the theoretical primitivism of international law in 
comparison to national law.
30
 Justiciability of norms is often made a condition of legal status, 
and the “perfection” of international law is measured against “more evolved” models of 
national jurisdictions with centralized judicial, administrative and legal measures of 
                                                          
26
 For other duty bearers see Andrew Clapham, Human rights obligations of non-state actors (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2006); Andrea Bianchi, “The Fight for Inclusion: Non-State Actor and International Law” in 
Ulrich Fastenrath e.a. (eds.) From Bilateralism to Community Interest. Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2011) 39. 
27
 See William A Schabas “On the Binding Nature of the Findings of the Treaty Bodies” in M Cherif Bassiouni 
and William A Schabas (eds.) New Challenges for the UN Human Rights Machinery (Intersentia, Cambridge, 
2011) 97. A critique of the scholarship supporting the idea of norms without legal consequence can be found in 
Jean d’Aspremont, “Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New Legal Materials” (2008) 19(5) 
EJIL 1075. See also reply to this article by Antony D’Amato (and Rejoinder by Jean d’Aspremont) in (2009) 20 
(3) EJIL 897& 911. 
28
 Sonja B. Starr, “Rethinking “Effective” Remedies: Remedial Deterrence in International Courts” (2008) 83 
NYUL Rev 693 at 698-710. See also Dinah Shelton, “Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State 
Responsibility” (2002) 96(4) AJIL 833. 
29
 See Prosper Weil, “Le droit international en quête de son identité. Cours général de droit international public” 
(1992-VI) 237 RCADI. 41 at 54-57.  
30
 See A Campbell “International Law and Primitive Law” (1998) 8(2) Oxford J Legal Stud 169. 
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enforcement.
31
 Following these premises it is often deduced logically that any step to get 
closer to this more perfect model is desirable.
32
 Thus, some believe that the best possible final 
model for human rights implementation entails the creation of a World Court on Human 
Rights.
33
 Or using Clapham words the creation of such a Court would be the equivalent to 
arriving in utopia, “simply the logical development of the project to protect human rights 
through international law.”34 
Without disregarding the merits of this proposal, present circumstances clearly do not 
support the creation of such a judicial body. The International Court of Justice has engaged 
contentious cases linked directly to human rights violations brought by States accepting its 
jurisdiction.
35
 This development is a recent occurrence and has proven to have its limitations. 
More than highlighting the willingness of States to bring human rights cases to the 
                                                          
31
 Similarly the status of “authentic” law has been made conditional to the existence of coercive sanctions to 
respond to any of breach of norms, although many scholars have rejected the sanction-based approaches to law. 
See Gordon A Christenson “The Jurisprudence of Sanctions in International Law” 31(4) Hum Rts Q 1086 at 
1087-9. 
32
 Prosper Weil (1992) at 55. See also Francesco Caportorti “Cours géneral de droit international public” (1994-
IV) 248 RCADI 9 esp. at 27-30. For a criticism about a related phenomenon, the “legalization” of international 
law, see, Jean D’Aspremont “La Doctrine du Droit International Face à la Tentation de la ‘Juridicisation’ sans 
limites” (2008) 112(4) Revue Générale de Droit International Public 849.  
33
 For past and current proposals see Nanette Dumas “Enforcement of Human Rights Standards: An 
International Human Rights Court and Other Proposals” (1990) 13(3) Hastings Int'l & Comp L Rev 585; 
Manfred Nowak “The Need for a World Court on Human Rights” (2007) 7(1) Hum Rts L Rev 251; also by 
Nowak (2011) above note 18; Mckenzie suggests that the solution depends on national Courts, see John 
McKenzie, “The Limits of Offshoring-Why the United States Should Keep Enforcement of Human Rights 
Standards ‘In-House’ (2009) 83(3) Ind L J 1121. 
34
 Andrew Clapham, “Overseeing Human Rights Compliance” in Antonio Cassesse (ed.) Realizing Utopia. The 
Future of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 318 at 323-324. 
35
 Rosalyn Higgins, “Human Rights in the International Court of Justice” (2007) 20(4) Leiden Journal of 
International Law 745; Raymond Goy, La Cour Internationale de Justice et les Droits de L’homme (Bruylant, 
Bruxelles, 2002); William Schabas “Genocide and the International Court of Justice: Finally, a Duty to Prevent 
the Crime of Crimes” (2007) 15(4) International Studies Journal 17. 
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International Court of Justice, they seem to show the awareness of some lawyers and judges 
of the possibilities of jurisdiction created by human rights treaties. As a consequence, 
disputes only tangentially related to human rights have been put forward to the International 
Court of Justice.
36
 Individuals have direct access to the European Court on Human Rights and 
indirect access to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights. However, the jurisdiction of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has not been accepted by all States within the 
continent most notably, by the United States of America and Canada. It has been necessary to 
wait until 15 December 2009, for the first ever judgment of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, an inadmissibility decision due to lack of jurisdiction. 37 The treaty-body 
machinery of the UN with competence to deal with individual cases shows that a large 
number of states are not willing to grant individuals direct access to these committees, despite 
their decisions not being legally binding. Although ratifications of the core human rights 
treaties are rising, in all cases, the number of countries who have ratified the optional 
protocol or treaty article authorizing the appropriate treaty-body to review individual 
                                                          
36 
This would be true for the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Georgia v Russian Federation) (Preliminary Objections) Judgment 1 April 2011 (only available 
on-line at the time of writing at: http://www.icj-cij.org) where the ICJ decided lack of jurisdiction only after 
having indicated provisional measures in 2008 [Application of the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation) (Provisional Measures Order) 2008 ICJ. 
Rep 388]. Another 21
st
 century case where human rights treaty violations were used as means to access the 
jurisdiction of the Court more than reflecting the central issue of conflict is the Case Concerning Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) (Merits), 2005 ICJ Rep 
168; Human rights issues are nonetheless central in: Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of 
Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo) (Merits) 2010 (only available on-line at the time of writing at 
http://www.icj-cij.org); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 ICJ Rep 136; and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits), 2007 ICJ Rep 43. 
37
 Michelot Yogogombaye v The Republic of Senegal (Application No. 001/2008). 
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complaints filed against the country is significantly lower than the state parties to the 
treaties.
38
  
In brief, for the vast majority of the world there remains no access to international 
judicial or quasi-judicial bodies competent to address violations of their human rights. This 
means, in the logic of international law, that the vast majority of the States of the world are 
not willing to accept such a mechanism. As Opsahl noted twenty years ago “to expect 
international enforcement is still utopian” and enforcement measures “cannot be the yardstick 
by which to measure implementation”.39 The comparison between national and international 
systems is not possible here, with Opsahl advocating the necessity of a “softer approach” 
rather than the traditional model of “right-breach-responsibility-process-sanction, leading to 
punishment of any violator or at least to redress for any victim”. 40  Theories of law 
enforcement based on these ideas do not provide a solution to the main problem of improving 
the observance of substantive rights at domestic level. 
Nevertheless, the traditional legal approach to human rights violations and the appeal 
for undesirable consequences for those violating the law is intrinsic to any set of regulations. 
The fight against impunity is central to any human rights agenda and implies prosecution, 
redress and punishment. Because the implementation and enforcement machinery of 
international human rights standards cannot be expected from a centralized, impartial 
                                                          
38
 By the June 2012, 114 states had ratified the Optional Protocol to ICCPR against the 167 State parties to the 
ICCPR. The numbers are lower for the other treaty-bodies dealing with communications: 104 States accept 
CEDAW’s competence (against 187 States Parties); 53 from the CERD (of 175); 64 in the case of CAT (of 
150); 66 for CRPD (of 109), 11 for CED (of 32) and 8 for CESCR (of 160). 
39
 Torkel Opsahl “Instruments of Implementation of Human Rights” (1989) 10(1-2) Hum Rts L J 13 at 14. 
40
 Ibid 31 and 32. On the difference between enforcement and compliance at international and national law 
level, see also: Oscar Schachter “United Nations Law” (1994) 88(1) AJIL 1 at 14-16. 
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supranational universal authority, other means of implementation are used by international 
bodies seeking to put pressure on the State to compel a change of behaviour respectful of 
human rights standards. The most popular method is the so-called “naming and shaming” 
strategy (or “mobilization of shame”) seeking to prevent, and punish human rights violators. 
Other forms of coercive measures on States, such as counter-measures or sanctions, also 
respond to the logic of remedies and punishments but they present, as we will see in the 
following paragraphs, their own problems in terms of compatibility with the same standards 
they intend to protect. The following pages give a brief overview of the main strategies 
currently used to promote and protect human rights using confrontational approaches. 
“Naming and Shaming” and Other Confrontational Approaches for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights 
A. Naming and Shaming 
Naming and shaming is one of the primary tools of international human rights bodies. For 
most of them, their source of power, and where their effectiveness is perceived as resting, lies 
in the publicity of their actions, that is, on “shaming” those countries and practices identified 
in their reports and decisions as contrary to international standards. This applies to all human 
rights bodies with monitoring competences, including Courts with power to issue binding 
decisions, but with no enforcement powers at the domestic level. The universal and regional 
human rights regimes created in the aftermath of the Second World War were designed on a 
model based on the strategy of “naming and shaming” states allegedly violating civil and 
political rights under their jurisdictions. For decades, this approach kept international human 
rights mechanisms focused on the promotion and protection of civil and political rights, the 
fight against impunity and the delimitation of the elements that determine the responsibility 
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of states for rights violations. Therefore, the human rights machinery has been conceived not 
so much to provide legal remedies to victims, but rather as “fact-finding tools to expose 
human rights violations, to unmask those responsible and to prevent future human rights 
violations.”41 
The mere existence of a decision by an international body acknowledging the existence of 
wrongdoing may, in certain cases, serve as a form of punishment and therefore as a potential 
basis for reparation.
42
 In addition, in performing their functions, adjudicatory bodies 
contribute to the clarification, delimitation, interpretation and further development of human 
rights standards. However these are secondary outcomes to the main tool most human rights 
bodies rely on to pursue the promotion and protection of human rights: the mobilization of 
shame against the concerned State. UN treaty-bodies and charter-bodies use this technique 
profusely although there is a basic difference between them: States have consented through 
ratification of the appropriate treaty to be monitored by the committee of experts established 
by the “core international human rights instruments”,43 whereas the decision to create charter-
bodies mechanisms depends on a collective decision of a political body.
 44
  
                                                          
41
 Manfred Nowak, Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime, 268 (Martinus Nihjoff, Leiden, 
2003). 
42
 See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations 
of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted by GA 
Res. 60/147 16 December 2005, principle 23. Also, Eric Wyler and Alain Papaux, “The Different Forms of 
Reparation: Satisfaction” in James Crawford, Alain Pellet & Simon Olleson (eds.) The Law of International 
Responsibility (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 623 at 631 
43
 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 660 UNTS 195 (signed 7 
March 1966, entered into force 4 January 1969); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 993 UNTS 3 (signed 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976); International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (signed 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976); 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 1249 UNTS 13 (signed 18 
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It is not only independent experts of international monitoring bodies who rely on 
“shaming”. Various political bodies engage in putting countries in uncomfortable positions 
publicly on the basis of their human rights records. The approval of a statement or resolution 
by the Security Council, the General Assembly or the Human Rights Council deploring the 
situation of human rights in a particular country, usually requesting specific actions by the 
State concerned, constitutes the most visible form of naming and shaming, with the hope that 
public embarrassment will lead to domestic changes and a national policy more respectful 
towards human rights. Irrespective of the content of any resolution, the approval of a country-
specific resolution always represents a strident political step, since it implies condemnation 
based on the existence of a situation of gross and systematic violation of human rights by a 
sovereign State against a fellow sovereign State. The appointment of a country mandate to 
monitor the situation of the State concerned and to publicly report its findings with the further 
possibility of carrying out visits in situ or accepting individual allegations, represents a 
stronger condemnation with the same strategy, that is, to prompt the State to ameliorate the 
situation as soon as possible to escape public ignominy. Some authors categorize these 
resolutions as self-executing acts of international organizations based on the fulfilment of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981); Convention against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1465 UNTS 85 (signed 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 
1987); Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3 (signed 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 
September 1990); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families 2220 UNTS 3 (signed 18 December 1990, entered into force 1 July 2003); 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2515 UNTS 3 (signed 13 December 2006, entered into 
force 3 May 2008); and International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance Doc. A/61/488-C.N. 737.2008.TREATIES-12 (signed 20 December 2006, entered into force 23 
December 2010). 
44
 For a broader definition of “charter-based” body, see, Victor Condé, A Handbook of International Human 
Rights Terminology, 16 (1999). 
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their primary objective -condemnation of the state concerned- by their mere adoption and 
publication.
45
 It is possible to argue, in legal terms, that: 
...[i]nitiating country-specific action should not be considered an act of confrontation, 
but rather as a legitimate attempt to place a worrying human rights situation under 
international scrutiny and through this to enhance respect for human rights.
46
  
In other words it is not the narrator, but the violations that ought to be condemned. However 
the delegation of powers of criticism to independent experts or groups of independent experts 
are clearly conceived and perceived as confrontational by those at the receiving end of such 
censure.
47
  
States united under the LMG and other states from Asia, Africa and members of the 
Islamic Conference Organization have repeatedly called for the suppression of “country 
resolutions” and monitoring mechanisms focused on specific territories, arguing that country 
condemnation lead to selectivity and double-standards naturally applied by political bodies.
48
 
Beyond accusations of politicization, interference in domestic affairs, and undue use of 
hegemonic powers, States opposing country-specific action by the Council support the idea 
that the “politics of shame” is unsatisfactory as a strategic tool to promote and protect human 
rights because it is ineffective. Yet this assertion is as difficult to refute as it is to support. 
Studies attempting to determine the efficiency of shaming countries as a primary tool to 
                                                          
45
 Ebere Osieke, “The legal validity of ultra vires decisions of International Organizations” (1983) 77(2) AJIL 
239 at 252.  
46
 Lempinen (2005) above n 12 at 191. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 On the different positions of specific States on this see, Elvira Domínguez-Redondo, “Rethinking the Legal 
Foundations of Control in International Human Rights Law-The Case of Public Special Procedures” (2011) 
29(3) NQHR 261 at 274-5. 
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promote and protect human rights have not led to clear conclusions, and may equally be used 
to support arguments of countries against such strategies.
49
 Other analyses suggest that the 
impact of naming and shaming on the reputation of states is weaker than conventionally 
imagined in relation to compliance with international legal obligations, human rights related 
or not.
50
 However, according to a study undertaken by Lebovic and Voeten, the adoption of 
resolutions by the former UN Commission on Human Rights condemning a country’s human 
rights record resulted in significant reduction (about one-third) in aid received by the targeted 
country.
51
 This study suggests that “shaming” does translate to real sanctions. Taking into 
account the considerations explained below on the detrimental effect on human rights of 
sanctions and conditional policies it remains doubtful whether a reduction of aid benefits the 
situation of human rights in the concerned countries. In other words, though naming and 
shaming may be a measure with more teeth than normally perceived, it may not necessarily 
equate to greater compliance with human rights standards. 
                                                          
49
 Emilie M. Haftner-Burton “Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights. Enforcement 
Problem” (2008) 62(3) Int’l Org 689. Ratification of the ICCPR for instance has been associated to a worsening 
of human rights enjoyment, see Oona A. Hathaway “Do human rights treaties make a difference?” (2002) 
111(8) Yale L J 1935; Todd Landman, Protecting Human Rights. A comparative study (Georgetown University 
Press, Washington DC, 2005). More sophisticated analysis in recent years suggests that the typology of rights 
and the cost of producing evidence are relevant factors when measuring impact of ratification of treaties and 
implementation at domestic level as explored in Yonathan Lupu, Best Evidence: The Role of Information in 
Domestic Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights Agreements 4-6 (Draft Paper, October 2011) at: 
http://dss.ucsd.edu/~ylupu/Best%20Evidence.pdf. In line with this more complex view on the impact of human 
rights treaties’ ratification of see also, Beth A Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in 
Domestic Politics (Harvard University, Massachusetts, 2009).  
50
 George W. Downs and Michael Jones, “Reputation, Compliance and International Law” 31(1) Journal of 
Legal Studies 95 (2002).  
51
 James H. Lebovic and Erik Voeten, “The Cost of Shame: International Organizations and Foreign Aid on the 
Punishing of Human Rights Violators” (2009) 46(1) Journal of Peace Research 79.  
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The arguments against naming and shaming strategies are not confined to a group of 
States. Referring to the prime method used by human rights NGOs, that is, the exercise of 
pressure to achieve “mobilization of shame”, Uvin describes this strategy as “confrontational, 
arm-twisting, [and] threat-based”. 52  The possibility of false accusations has led some 
academics to highlight the risks of naming and shaming strategies.
53
 Exacerbating the 
artificial distinction between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural 
rights, Ken Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, has argued that shaming 
strategies are not the most suitable to deal with violations of economic, social and cultural 
rights. This ostensibly justifies NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, whose methodology 
relies primarily on investigating, exposing and shaming, and is not concerned with addressing 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights involving issues of distributive justice, 
unless discriminatory or arbitrary governmental conduct can be identified.
54
  
B. Other confrontational approaches: Retortion, Counter-Measures, Conditionalities and 
Sanctions 
The most common strategy through which to pressurize states to fulfil their human rights 
obligations remains the act of revealing the violations occurring within its jurisdiction. Other 
international mechanisms of enforcement that have been tried to a lesser degree, include 
retortion, counter-measures, conditionalities and sanctions. It is beyond the scope of this 
                                                          
52
 Peter Uvin, Human Rights and Development (Kumarian Press, Bloomfield, CT, 2004), 57. 
53
 See Therese O’Donnell, “Naming and Shaming: The Sorry Tale of Security Council Resolution 1530 (2004)” 
(2006) 17(5) EJIL 945; and Elad Peled, “Should States have a right to reputation? Applying the rationale of 
defamation law to the international area” (2010) 35(1) Brook. J Int’l L 107. 
54
 See Kenneth Roth “Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by and 
International Human Rights Organization” (2004) 26(1) Hum Rts Q 63. Responding to this and advocating 
effective “naming and shaming” methodologies see Leonard S. Rubenstein “How International Human Rights 
Organizations Can Advance Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (2004) 26(4) Hum Rts Q 846. 
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paper to unravel the complexity of each of these concepts and to explain in detail how they 
have been used. However, it is worth introducing a brief reminder of the main difficulties met 
by States and intergovernmental actors when faced with the decision to use such mechanisms 
to impose human rights compliance. 
States and -to the extent their competences allow it- intergovernmental organizations 
can use coercive measures to impose human rights compliance on other States. With the clear 
limit of the prohibition of the use of force, and given that the international community does 
not have a centralized enforcement mechanism, States may respond unilaterally or 
collectively to breaches of international law, unless they have expressly delegated part of this 
competence to an international organ. When the response to a breach of international norms 
is taken by an international organization they are called “sanctions” instead of “counter-
measures”.55 Counter-measures imply the breach of an international obligation as a response 
to another breach, and therefore are conceived as circumstances precluding the wrongfulness 
of conduct that would otherwise raise international responsibility of the State.
56
 Conversely, 
acts of retortion are hostile responses to another States’ lawful or unlawful actions, not 
implying in themselves a breach of international law. The expulsion of diplomatic 
                                                          
55
 James Crawford, “The Relationship between Sanctions and Countermeasures” in Vera Gowlland-Debbas 
(ed.) United Nations Sanctions and International Law (Kluwer International, The Hague, 2001) 57. See also 
Georges M. Abi-Saab, “De la sanction en droit international. Essai de clarification” in Jerzy Makarczyk (ed.) 
Theory of International Law ant the Threshold of the 21
st
 Century. Essays in honour of Krzystof Skubiszewski, 
(Kluwer International, The Hague, 1996 ) 61. 
56
 International Law Commission (ILC), Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, Report of the ILC on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess, Supp No 10, p 
43, UN Doc A/56/10 (2001), articles 22-26. 
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representatives, denial of visas to nationals of the State concerned, and/or the termination of 
economic agreements fit into this category. 
57
 
Since at least some human rights obligations are generally understood as erga 
omnes,
58
 or “solidarity obligations”, where obligations such as those relating to human rights 
are breached, the entire international community of States would be entitled to invoke 
international responsibility of the State concerned.
59
 
Attempting to use traditional decentralized inter-state coercive measures to compel 
respect for human rights is difficult to reconcile with the enforcement of human rights 
standards. First, human rights violations cannot be used as a counter-measure themselves, and 
therefore it is not possible to justify the violation of human rights as a legitimate response to a 
breach of human rights by another State.
60
 Second, the enforcement of counter-measures 
tends to inflict further suffering on those who the measures intend to protect. This problem is 
                                                          
57
 Lori F Damrosch, “Enforcing International Law Through Non0Frocible Measures” (1997-III) 269 RCADI 9 
at 91-99. 
58
 The terminology as such was introduced as an obiter dictum by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction Case: 
Barcelona Traction, Lights and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) (Merits) [1970] ICJ Reports 3, 
paragraph 33. The ICJ has applied the concept in other cases since. See Karl Zemarek, “New Trends in the 
Enforcement of erga omnes obligations”, 4 Max Planck UNYB 1, 10-12 (2004) ; see also Sandesh Sivakumaran, 
“Impact on the Structures of International Obligations” in Menno T Kamminga and Martin Scheinin (eds.) The 
Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009)133. 
59
 On the conceptual difficulties attached to the term “obligation erga omnes” and its application, see Shabtai 
Rosenne, “Some Reflections Erga Omnes” in Anthony Anghie & Garry Sturgess (eds.) Legal Visions of the 21st 
Century: Essays in Honour of Judge Christopher Weeramantry (Kluwer International, The Hague, 1998) 509; 
Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1997); Christian J Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2009)  
60
 ILC, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the ILC on 
the Work of its Fifty-third Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess, Supp No 10, p 43, UN Doc A/56/10 (2001), 
Commentaries to Chapter II (Countermeasures) at p. 129, paragraph 5. 
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shared with centralized imposition of coercive measures by intergovernmental bodies 
(sanctions). Comprehensive sanctions are particularly problematic since they constitute a 
form of collective punishment and do not comply with the ethical principle of individual 
responsibility.
61
 In addition there is much evidence to question their effectiveness.
62
 A cross-
national empirical analysis for the period 1981-2000 published in 2009, concluded that 
“economic sanctions deteriorate citizens’ physical integrity rights”,63 with others suggesting 
that this is particularly true when sanctions are directed against dictatorships.
64
 In conclusion, 
…sanctions all too often are a poor alibi for, not a sound supplement to, a good 
foreign policy. They are ineffective, counter-productive, harmful to the economic 
interests of those imposing sanctions, damaging to relations with allies, morally 
questionable, yet difficult to lift once imposed.
65
 
UN human rights bodies do not engage in the use of conditional policies with the declared 
objective of prompting human rights compliance and this is therefore outside the scope of this 
                                                          
61
 Hans Köchler, Ethical Aspects of Sanctions in International Law. The Practice of the Sanctions Policy and 
Human Rights, International Progress Organization (I.P.O.) Research Papers (1994) available at http://i-p-
o.org/sanctp.htm. 
62
 A striking example reporting the failings of the sanctions imposed to Angola has been documented by the UN 
itself, see Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA included 
in Letter UN doc. S/2000/2003, 10 March 2000.  
63
 Dursun Peksen, “Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights” (2009) 46 (1) 
Journal of Peace Research, 59. See also Mohamed Bennouna, “Les sanctions économiques des Nations Unies” 
(2002-I) 200 RCADI 9 esp. 40-47. 
64
 Cristiane Careniero and Dominique Elden, “Economic Sanctions, Leadership survival and human rights” 
(2009) 30(3) U Pa J Int’l L 969. 
65
 Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security. From Collective Security to the Responsibility to 
Protect (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006) at 135, see especially pp. 134-155; and Alexander 
Orakhelashvili, Collective Security (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) at 188-220, in particular the 
summary of the humanitarian disaster inflicted by the comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq, Former 
Yugoslavia and Haiti at 204-210 
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article. It is nonetheless worth emphasizing that this political tool is often used in articulating 
concepts of development and human rights; conditional cash transfers programmes aiming at 
alleviating poverty have been an issue under focus by the HRC Special Rapporteur on 
extreme poverty who has concluded that conditionalities may undermine the autonomy of 
beneficiaries, reinforce stereotypes linked to gender and to persons living in poverty as 
incapable of responsible decision-making.
66
 Large numbers of developing States united under 
the “Group of 77” and other political alliances such as the LMG, are opposed to coercive 
approaches imposing political and economic conditionality attached to compliance with civil 
and political rights.
67
 This view is widely shared by commentators and human rights 
advocates from the North and South, who use similar arguments as those directed against the 
use of sanctions to improve human rights situations. Political conditionality is predominantly 
perceived as unethical, ineffective, and counterproductive, as well as impossible to 
implement.
68
 Particularly, conditionality clauses often come at the expense of economic, 
social and cultural rights, thus introducing a further schism in the indivisibility of the human 
rights agenda.
69
 
Assessment of the Added Value and Potential of the Universal Periodic Review  
                                                          
66
 See report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of human rights extreme poverty, Magdalena Sepúlveda 
Carmona, UN doc. A/66/265, 4 August 2011, paragraphs 53-57; Compared to previous reports, the position of 
the Special Rapporteurs has become more critical with this kind of programmes, see UN doc. A/HRC/11/9, 27 
March 2009. 
67
 See for instance the Declaration of the South Summit adopted by the member countries of the Group of 77 and 
China during the first South Summit celebrated in Cuba, April 10-14, 2000, paragraph 21, available at 
http://www.g77.org/summit/Declaration_G77Summit.htm. 
68
 Peter Uvin, Human Rights and Development (Kumarian Press, Bloomfield, CT, 2004) at 54-82. 
69Chaloka Beyani, “The Legal Premises of the International Protection of Human Rights” in Guy S Goodwin-
Gill & Stefan Talmon (eds) The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1999) 21 at 22 . 
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On 13 October 2011 the first cycle of the UPR mechanism was completed. It was 
incontestably an overwhelming and unprecedented success in terms of State engagement with 
a human rights review process. All 192 States participated in the review with ninety eight per 
cent presenting a written national report
70
 and eighty per cent choosing to be represented at 
ministerial level during the process.
71
 The principles underpinning the creation of the UPR 
are clearly stated in the resolutions creating the mechanism: objectivity, transparency, non-
selectivity, constructive dialogue, and non-confrontation.
72
 
Beyond the confidential and little known space occupied by the complaint mechanism 
(former 1503 procedure),
73
 the UN human rights machinery is based largely on 
confrontational, naming and shaming mechanisms that, as explained earlier, may have more 
teeth than believed. The UPR has opened an alternative forum to take stock of the situation of 
human rights situations around the globe. Governed by principles of universality, dialogue 
between equals and co-operation, States have engaged with the process without exception. 
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 session on 10 
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 cycle. Friday 21 
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From the first session in 2008, the interactive dialogue has provided a holistic approach to 
social, economic, cultural, civil, political rights, development, vulnerable groups, human 
rights defenders, and gender, including the question of sexual orientation. Respect for human 
rights standards while countering terrorism, State responsibility for activities of its armed 
forces overseas, the issue of “extraordinary renditions” and questions about secret places of 
detention or non-ratification by Western Europe States of the Convention on Migrant 
Workers have been all raised.
74
  
Contrary to expectations the UPR does not replicate the modus operandi of expert 
mechanisms already operating by the dozen under the umbrella of the Organization.
75
 From 
the practice followed so far, it seems that very important positive outcomes can be gauged 
from the existence of the UPR.
76
 Among those, two are particularly important, firstly, the 
existence of the compilations of human rights information at country-level that can be used as 
the basis of follow-up for improving human rights in every State. Secondly, the potential of 
the UPR to contribute to the sources of international human rights.  
 A. Compiling human rights information at country level  
The recommendations and conclusions of special procedures mandate-holders and treaty-
bodies were broadly used as a basis for the questions and comments made during the 
interactive dialogue. This probably constitutes the first time human rights mechanisms 
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operating under the umbrella of the UN were used as effective informers of the situation of 
human rights in a given country in a concerted and consolidated manner. This also reveals 
what has been known for a long time: that the recommendations and conclusions drafted by 
some conventional and non-conventional mechanisms of the system are inadequate in 
assessing the situation of human rights of a given country.
77
 This process will certainly force 
human rights mechanisms to elaborate conclusions and recommendations that are useful for 
others stakeholders to review in future. Further research, outside the intended scope of these 
pages, is needed to assert which special procedures mandate-holders, treaty-body mechanism, 
NGO reports, and/or any other source of information used as a basis of the review seem to be 
the most useful, at least in terms of those most used to evaluate human rights situations in the 
context of the UPR. It remains too early to evaluate the full impact of the UPR, but it has 
shown potential for providing a political forum for following-up treaty-bodies’ and charter-
bodies’ activities and recommendations. Thus treaty bodies and special procedures may need 
to tailor their reporting and be more specific in their recommendations and conclusions if the 
UPR provides follow-up on their work.  
The fact that the UPR has forced NGOs and the OHCHR to compile information on 
human rights at country-level is by itself an unprecedented success on the grounds of the 
potential value of that information.
78
 Whether acknowledged expressly or not, prior to the 
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establishment of the UPR and the OHCHR compilation of information by country, every 
study evaluating human rights situations at country-level, including the effectiveness of 
international human rights mechanisms, relied on two main data sources: the US Department 
of State Human Rights Reports, and Amnesty International Annual Reports.
79
 To understand 
the relevance of the compilation of information on human rights at country-level, it is 
pertinent to recall that in the 2004 report A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, 
the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, recommended 
that the High Commissioner prepare an annual report on the situation of human rights 
worldwide, to serve as the basis for a comprehensive discussion with the then Commission 
(now Council).
80
 The report would have needed to focus on the implementation of all human 
rights in all countries, based on information stemming from the work of treaty bodies, special 
mechanisms and any other sources deemed appropriate by the High Commissioner.
81
 The 
High Commissioner responded timidly to this request in her Plan of Action submitted as an 
addendum to the Secretary-General’s In Larger Freedom Report, stating that it was essential 
that a fair and transparent method was developed to compile information upon which to base 
the new peer review mechanism without elaborating further.
82
 In practice, the OHCHR has 
published a compilation of the UN human rights documents on a country by country basis on 
its Website, under the title “Human Rights in the World” avoiding analysis or assessments 
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over the meaning of that information.
83
 The compilation includes information on the status of 
ratifications of human rights treaties, reporting status, open invitations issued to special 
procedures, voluntary pledges and commitments made by the State to support their candidacy 
as members of the HRC, documents resulting from the UPR process and other human rights 
related documents published by external bodies such as national human rights institutions or 
specialised UN agencies. 
The compilation of the work of UN human rights bodies as the basis for the UPR has 
provided an unprecedented opportunity to follow-up the implementation of their conclusion 
and recommendations. Those familiar with proposals made in the past aimed at reinforcing 
the competence of the former Commission on Human Rights to follow-up the work of its 
subsidiary organs know that those proposals have been effectively blocked by Asian and 
African States and that by itself this compilation signals an unprecedented success for the UN 
human rights machinery. For years some proposals were tabled to allow the adoption of 
decisions by the defunct Commission, its subsidiary organs, or the Office of the High 
Commissioner of Human Rights regarding the lack of governmental cooperation with human 
rights treaty-bodies. Until now, lack of political will has prevented any of these initiatives 
from prospering.
84
 It is worth recalling the fate of a far less ambitious initiative advanced to 
highlight observations or recommendations on the issue of follow-up on prior 
recommendations; and to name non-cooperating countries in executive summaries that 
precede the reports of mandate-holders of public special procedures since 2000.
85
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Governmental opposition to this proposal was strong enough to remove it from those 
approved in the reform process undertaken by the Commission on Human Rights between 
1998 and 2000.
86
 The systematic compilation of information on a geographic basis would not 
only facilitate follow-up of the implementations of recommendations by UN governmental 
and expert human rights bodies, but also by other stakeholders such as human rights NGOs 
and national human rights institutions. It should also serve to improve the quality and 
capacity of the OHCHR to provide technical assistance. It is well within the realm of 
possibilities that this first ever country-specific human rights database generated by the 
Office of the High Commissioner will have a positive impact on its monitoring, information-
collection and public education and training capacities. Finally, the problems of availability 
of human rights information produced by the UN itself as a factor contributing to the 
mismanagement of peacekeeping operations should also improve.
87
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As explained in the next section, there is already a database of UPR recommendations 
containing indicators of its impact on the enjoyment of human rights at national level. This 
highlights the unprecedented value of the information gathered through the UPR process.  
  
B. Indicators of Impact on Human Rights Implementation 
 
A second positive outcome of the UPR process that this article seeks to draw attention to is 
the potential value of the commitment of countries to human rights as a result of engaging 
with the mechanism. If the next cycles of the UPR do not change the dynamics established 
during the first cycle (one hundred per cent participation at very high governmental level) the 
national reports on the situation of human rights in the country would be excellent and 
unprecedented primary sources to gauge the State’s opinion juris on human rights.88 The first 
UPR cycle’s balance is extremely positive here. Notwithstanding the cultural relativism 
debate and independent of poor human rights records, States have not denied the concept of 
human rights as such, nor have they undermined the legitimacy and practice of other human 
rights bodies, on which they have relied in compiling their review.  
Conclusions of preliminary research testing the effectiveness of the UPR based on the 
analysis and scoring of implementation actions of governments in response to their accepted 
UPR recommendations, suggest that the UPR process is worth investing in. About 68 per cent 
of the 10,262 recommendations made in the first seven sessions of the UPR were accepted by 
States, 13 per cent were rejected and 19 per cent received an unclear response, or were still 
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pending according to the database on recommendations developed by the NGO UPR-Info.
89
 
The early results of research measuring the impact of the UPR on the enjoyment of human 
rights at national level are even more striking. David Frazier has developed a model to 
measure such impact awarding scores to countries based on whether individual 
recommendations had been fully, partially or not implemented. Scores for each 
recommendation were averaged into a value the author labels Accepted Recommendation 
Implementation (ARIS).
90
 The main conclusions provide reason for optimism: 
The UPR has helped encourage countries of all development levels to act to protect 
human rights. In addition, the more developed countries have been far better at 
implementing a higher percentage of their recommendations, as shown in this paper 
by correspondingly high ARIS values.
91
  
 David Frazier considers that the success of the UPR is based on its “naming and shaming” 
effect.
92
 While the existence of a residual name and shame dimension cannot be discarded as 
a contributing factor to the perceived responsiveness of states to the UPR recommendations, 
it is suggested that the grounding of the mechanism on the principle of cooperation and peer 
review and the corresponding spirit with which many of those states adverse to 
confrontational mechanisms have engaged with the UPR process has played an important role 
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in contributing to the implementation of recommendations emerging from it.
93
  
 
C. Reinforcement of International Human Rights Obligations 
 
Having only completed its first cycle, it would be premature to present a theory on the impact 
of the UPR on the sources of international human rights norms. However, the outcomes so far 
suggest that contrary to the fears articulated by sceptics, the UPR could contribute to 
reinforcing rather than debilitating existing human rights obligations. Because States can 
accept or reject recommendations made in the context of the UPR process some 
commentators feared that States would undermine human rights obligations by rejecting 
recommendations which corresponded to their conventional obligations.
94
 
This fear has proved ill-founded. First of all, it seems to contradict the practice of 
States to date, which would appear to be more in line with using the UPR as a form of interim 
follow-up of treaty body recommendations than a backdoor for contradicting them,
95
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although different interpretation may be inferred from this lack of contradiction.
96
 More 
importantly, a rejection by a State of a recommendation resulting from the UPR cannot 
legally be construed as undermining a conventional obligation of the State. The terms of 
article 42.2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties could not be clearer: 
The termination of a treaty, its denunciation or the withdrawal of a party, may take 
place only as a result of the application of the provisions of the treaty or of the present 
Convention. The same rule applies to suspension of the operation of a treaty
97
 
.The Human Rights Committee has held that, in the absence of provisions regarding their 
termination, denunciation or withdrawals, treaties codifying universal human rights are 
protected against unilateral acts of States aimed at their denunciation according to the 
provisions laid out in articles 54 and subsequent articles of the Vienna Convention of the Law 
of Treaties, which are generally accepted as reflecting customary law.
98
 Resource to this 
argumentation is however unnecessary as the rejection of a recommendation in the Human 
Rights Council cannot be interpreted as fulfilling the requirements for withdrawing from 
conventional obligations as regulated by the law of treaties. In addition to the plain wording 
of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the rationale of the 
International Court of Justice in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
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Republic of Congo v Rwanda) holding that in order to have legal effect in international law, 
the withdrawal of a reservation to a treaty is subject to the legal regime established for their 
notification at international level, is applicable mutatis mutandis here.
99
 
The rejection of a recommendation relating to pre-existing binding obligation should 
note be interpreted as undermining legal obligations, but rather as means by which States can 
withhold their consent to the nature of the monitoring of those obligations under the UPR. As 
explained elsewhere, the consent required to be bound by a treaty is different from the 
consent needed to endow an international organ with power to monitor compliance of that 
treaty or any other international legal norm.
100
 If a State rejects a recommendation made by 
another State in the context of the UPR this does not mean, in legal terms, that it is not legally 
bound by that obligation, nor does it imply that the State concerned is trying to weaken its 
commitment towards a particular human right norm. It is asserting its reluctance to be 
monitored by the UPR on the implementation of such a recommendation during its next 
review.
101
 
Conversely, if the process itself does not lead to engagement fatigue, and if 
governments maintain first cycle trends of close to one hundred per cent participation, 
involving the highest level of governmental representation, the UPR could offer evidence of 
opinio juris thereby accelerating the formation of new customary law and consolidating 
existing customary standards. The Human Rights Council clearly fits the category of a body 
with the capacity to produce such a result, particularly if we accept a conception of customary 
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law where clear evidence of opinio juris minimises the need for consistent State practice. In 
the words of Brian Lepard: 
Where states believe that a particular norm should be recognized as legally 
authoritative because states have made universal promises to all other states to behave 
in the way called for by the norm, the evidentiary role of state practice should also be 
minimized. This is because states themselves believe that the promise of certain 
behaviour –whether or not states already engage in that behaviour- is the reason to 
make it obligatory.
102
 
The acceptance of recommendations at ministerial level in an intergovernmental forum could 
also be construed as a unilateral act of State, and therefore capable of creating autonomous 
sources of obligations according to the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Treat 
Case (Australia v France).
103
 In this case the Court gave particular importance to the fact that 
the French statements were made “publicly and erga omnes” and through them, its intention 
was “conveyed to the world at large”.104 
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CONCLUSION 
The politicisation of human rights at inter-governmental level, especially in response to 
naming and shaming, has been a constant threat to the United Nations rights-based edifice. 
The objections of States to this modus-operandi of some human rights mechanisms 
contributed to their ineffectiveness in the past, and also contributed to the demise of the 
Commission. The new Human Rights Council’s UPR mechanism was viewed with a degree 
of pessimism by human rights activists and academics, who felt that as a peer review 
mechanism it was likely to be “soft” on states. States engaged with the UPR wholeheartedly, 
viewing it as non-confrontational and relying on existing human rights information to form 
the basis for review. Their engagement displayed two prominent features in the first review 
cycle: one hundred per cent engagement (possibly the first time a human rights mechanism 
has resulted in universal engagement); and a high degree of ministerial level participation. 
The impact of this phenomenon has meant that the human rights record of every state 
has been scrutinised, creating a body of information on states’ human rights compliance that 
is unprecedented, not only for its thoroughness, but also because it draws on a variety of 
sources including ministerial level articulations. The ultimate value of the process can be 
gauged through the creation of a strong data set on human rights information on a country-
by-country basis. More importantly, the engagement of States in the process can be said to 
have provided concerted evidence of opinio juris, thereby substantiating and consolidating 
human rights standards. UPR commitments can also be construed as legally binding states to 
human rights provisions in a manner unprecedented in the history of international human 
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rights law, although the wisdom of that strategy merits further consideration. 
The positive results of the UPR seem linked to its political nature and the fact that this 
human rights monitoring mechanism is led by States rather than expert bodies. This is its 
distinctive trait and attempts to evaluate its results without understanding its political nature 
are theoretical exercises with little value. The cooperative dimension (and its perception as 
such by certain States) is important, and has so far led to a practice of equal treatment often 
lacking in the workings the former Commission. Still, as has been pointed out before, no 
mechanism is purely cooperative or confrontational, with all human rights monitoring bodies 
tending to mix confrontational and cooperative approaches to greater or lesser degrees. This 
is also the case of the UPR mechanism. A State not appearing before the UPR would clearly 
lose face. Likewise for a State not to follow up on UPR recommendations may result in 
embarrassment, something that can only be evaluated after completion of the second cycle.  
Naming and shaming still has an important place in the practice of international 
human rights: mainly when used by NGOs and human rights bodies to highlight the results of 
the UPR. Such approaches are likely to complement the more diplomatic ethos of the HRC. 
In addition a number of states on the Human Rights Council have maintained more 
confrontational forms of scrutiny, thereby illustrating that the UPR is a mechanism which is 
capable of embodying a range of methods for assessing human rights realization.  
The UPR has the potential to play a significant role in the formation, definition, 
clarification and consolidation of human rights costumary rules. The publicity and 
characteristics of the forum, and the personalities accepting UPR recommendations, provide a 
unique context in which the public promises made by States could be construed as unilateral 
acts which fulfil the requirements for establishing new binding obligations. More time and 
research is needed to analyse the content of these promises, and whether or not States are 
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undertaking them with the clear intention to be legally bound by them. However, the potential 
for the UPR to act in this manner is clearly there. At the very least, it is providing an 
exceptional source of data regarding the opinio juris of States regarding human rights 
obligations worldwide. 
 
 
 
 
